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The Inequality of Anti-establishment
William P. Marshall*
Already in this Conference, one thing has become obvious.
Religion Clause jurisprudence creates strange and shifting
alliances and there is little predictability as to how one's
political stance will affect one's approach to specific religion
clause issues.' For example, I note that Professor Pepper is
aligned with former Solicitor General Starr in a combined
attack on Smith: yet, I suspect, these two would disagree on
most other constitutional issues, including those decided in Lee
U. Wei~man.~
Smith, of course, has been roundly attacked elsewhere and
the previous presentations of Pepper and Starr suggest that it
is likely to receive significant negative comment here. I am
therefore tempted, as one of Smith's few supporters, to spend
my time defending the Smith decision. I do not plan to do so,
however. Rather, I will test Smith's validity by applying my
understanding of the case to Establishment Clause issues.
Specifically, I will attempt to reconcile how the rationale that I
believe justifies Smith (i.e., the principle of equality of ideas)
can be found inapposite when applied t o Establishment Clause
issues. To state the issue as succinctly as possible, I will
discuss whether it is consistent to single out religious belief
systems for adverse treatment under the Establishment Clause

*

Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I would
like to express my appreciation to Cole Durham and Fred Gedicks for organizing
this Conference and honoring me with their invitation. I am especially grateful
because Professors Durham and Gedicks are two of the most thoughthl and
respected constitutional law professors in the country, and their work is some of
the best there is. It is always a privilege to meet with them and exchange ideas. I
am also pleased to once again be on the same panel as Steve Pepper. Professor
Pepper and I have been disagreeing over religion clause issues for ten years, and I
always learn much from our debates. Finally, it is an honor for me to be here
with the former Solicitor General of the United States, Mr. Kenneth Starr.
1. See Michael W. McConnell, You Can't Tell the Players in Church-State
Disputes Without a Scorecard, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.PoL'Y 27 (1987).
2. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
3.

if all belief systems are purportedly equal, as I have argued in
my Smith d e f e n ~ e . ~
Of course, in one sense, this purported inconsistency is
easily avoided. After all, the First Amendment's commitment to
the equality-of-ideas principle applies when the ideas in
question are those of private actors-not the government. The
establishment restriction, on the other hand, applies only to
government speech. Nevertheless, I think it fair t o say that to
the extent the establishment prohibition singles out religious
ideas for adverse treatment, it runs counter to the general
theory of the equality of ideas even if it does not run counter to
specific constitutional prohibitions.
In any event, before addressing my central subject, let me
quickly step back and explain how an equality-of-belief-systems
notion works to justify Smith. My point, I believe, is best made
by reference to two free exercise decisions decided prior to
Smith.
. ~ Yoder, the Court
The first case is Wisconsin v. Y ~ d e r In
granted the Amish a free exercise religous exemption from
compulsory school attendance. In its opinion, however, the
Court was equally clear that persons who objected to
compulsory education based upon secular principles would not
be entitled to constitutional relief? The second case is Thomas
v. Review Board.' In Thomas, a person who protested, on
account of his religious beliefs, having to work in an armament
factory was granted a free exercise exemption from
unemployment insurance requirements. Again the Court
declared that if a person's objections were based on moral,
philosophical, or political principles, she would not be entitled
to constitutional relief.
My thesis, in defending Smith, was that these results were
inappropriate in that they preferred one type of belief system
(i.e., religious) over all others? Why should religious objections
to compulsory education or armaments work receive

William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
4.
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) [hereinafter, Marshall, Defense]; William P. Marshall,
The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV.357 (1989-90).
5. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6. The Court used the example of followers of Henry David Thoreau to
illustrate those who would not be entitled to constitutional exemption. Id. at 216.
7. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
8. Marshall, Defense, supra note 4, at 319-20.
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constitutional exemption from neutral laws of general
applicability, while parallel secular objections based upon
political, philosophical, or moral principle do not? Such a result,
I argued, not only creates bad policy under the Free Exercise
Clause, but also offends the central principle of freedom of
speech-that there is an equality in the realm of ideas.g Under
this principle, all ideas, regardless of whether they are based
on religious or secular beliefs, should be entitled to equal
constitutional status.
This "equality of principle," it should be noted, does not
always work to the detriment of the religious claimant as it did
in Smith. In other circumstances, it may work to vindicate the
religious claimant. For example, in Widmar v. Vincent1' the
Court held that the equality principle prohibited religious
speech from being singled out for disfavored treatment under
the Free Speech Clause. Indeed, the lesson after Smith and
Widmar might well be that the commitment to the principle of
the equality of ideas exists in two of the clauses of the First
AmendmentFree Exercise and Free Speech. As we shall see,
however, the principle has not been applied to the
Establishment Clause.
In Lee v. Weisman," Justice Kennedy, comparing freedom
of religion and freedom of speech, wrote as follows:
The E r s t Amendment protects speech and religion by quite
different mechanisms. Speech is protected by insuring its full
expression even when the government participates, for the
very object of some of our most important speech is to
persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own. The
method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of
conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In
religious debate or expression the government is not a prime
participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment
antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free Exercise Clause
embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close
parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment,
but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on
forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise
counterpart in the speech pro~isions.'~

9.
Id. at 312-13; see also K e ~ e t hL. Karst, Equality as a Centml Primipk in
the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.L. REV.20, 25 (1975).
10.
454 U.S.263 (1981).
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
11.
12. Id. at 2657 (citations omitted).
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In short, secular ideas can win, while religious ideas cannot.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, for the most part,13 is
descriptively accurate. The question is how can this announced
inequality, supposedly mandated by the Establishment Clause,
be justified? Two possible answers are immediately apparent.
The first is textual. The Establishment Clause applies only to
religion. The second is common sense. I am aware of no one
who actually believes that an anti-establishment provision is
not, at least in some sense, beneficial. No one is arguing for
theocracy. Text and common sense, however, while providing
quick answers, do not set forth the underlying rationale. What
is it that supports the contention that religious ideas may not
prevail in the political process while secular ideas may prevail?
A number of nonpersuasive reasons might be offered to
support this contention. One such reason might be that religion
is not political, and therefore, its exclusion from the political
process is not troublesome. This contention, however, fails on a
number of counts. First, freedom of speech protects not only
political speech, but also other kinds of speech." Second, and
more importantly, religion is political. The religious idea
presented in Thomas, that a person should not work in an
armament factory, is politically laden. Similarly, the religious
belief advanced in Bob Jones University v. United States,15
that it is appropriate t o engage in racial discrimination, is,
under any definition, political. Moreover, even when religion is
not overtly political, religious ideas have political effects.
Religious principles inform the morality which in turn informs
the political process.
A second justification for excluding religious ideas from the
political process might be that such ideas are not dialogic. This
contention is also not persuasive, and it is descriptively
inaccurate. Religion can, and often is, susceptible to reasoned
and dispassionate discussion. Moreover, and in any event,
dialogic qualities are not the touchstones of First Amendment

13. While Justice Kennedy is correct that religious ideas may not "win" in the
political process, he may have overstated the ability of non-religious ideas to
prevail. As Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), "[ilf there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."
14. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
15. 461 US. 574 (1983).
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protection. I need not repeat the statement that was protected
in Cohen v. Calif~rnia,'~
but the utterance was clearly not a
model of rational and dispassionate debate.
A third argument for excluding religious ideas from the
political process might be that religion depends on a different
epistemology than does speech. While speech depends on
notions of rationality, religion purportedly depends upon nonrational belief. This is an interesting and complex objection to
which we could devote a significant amount of time.
Fortunately, however, Professor Gedicks has already done our
work for us. In a recent article, he thoughtfully refuted the
epistemology contention, and in my opinion he is right." In a
postmodern world with no notion of objective truth, one cannot
claim that rational precepts are epistemologically superior to
non-rational beliefs. The argument simply does not work.
A fourth position might be that religious ideas are
especially dangerous. Again this is unconvincing. Although we
shall subsequently return t o a discussion of how religious
volatility may be of special concern,18 the dangerousness of
ideas cannot automatically distinguish religion from nonreligion. Certainly religious ideas can be dangerous, but so are
many non-religious ideas. After all, as Holmes stated, "every
idea is an incitement."lg
A fAh argument might be that religious ideas can
threaten religious freedom. Descriptively this is, of course,
accurate. There are existing religious systems which profess
that their word is the only word, and that every other word is
heresy and should be destroyed. Undoubtedly, these ideas
threaten religious freedom. But again, in speech clause
jurisprudence, the fact that some speech might threaten or
attack freedom of speech does not remove that form of speech
from constitutional prote~tion.~~
A sixth justification alluded t o by Professor Pepper is that
religion should be separated from government because when
religion gets involved in government, religion itself is
weakened. Under this theory, the anti-establishment mandate
16.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Lzfe and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV.
17.
671 (1992).
18. See i@a notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19.
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
20.
916 (1978).

68

BRIGWAM YOUNG UNIVERSIW LAW REVIEW [I993

is designed not only t o protect government from religion but
also to protect religion from government. From this angle,
treating religion differently than speech might be defended as a
pro-religion position.
This contention does come with a strong pedigree. It was
originally raised by Roger Williams and undoubtedly influenced
the Framers. The position is also sound. Ideas do become
compromised when they enter the political. process.
Nevertheless, I am not sure that even if government acceptance
does dilute ideas, that this alone is a reason to impose a First
Amendment restriction upon ideas entering the political
marketplace. At best it suggests that religion is best served by
imposing the limitation on itself.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee does not rely
on the Roger Williams rationale. Rather, Justice Kennedy's
explanation, in his words, "lies in the history that was and is
the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in
the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant
expression of religious views may end in a policy to
indoctrinate and coerce."21 It is in this passage that Justice
Kennedy provides the compelling reasons why religion is not
allowed to "win" in the political process, or in other words, why
an equality-of-ideas principle should not be allowed to trump
establishment concerns.
As Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests, when religion
"wins," problems arise. The reasons for this were alluded t o in
two talks that have already been given. Both former Solicitor
General Starr and Professor Pepper were concerned about the
manner in which religion behaved.22Both of them brought up
images of Bosnia and the ravages created when one particular
religion controls government in a multi-religious society. Yet
what is it about the union of religion and government that
leads t o such devastation? Let us quickly turn to this issue.
The religion clauses of the First Amendment and their
history suggest a dichotomy. On the one hand, they represent
the principle that religion and religious freedom are important
and seminal to a free society. On the other, they suggest there
is another side t o religion-one that creates a special danger

21. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2657.
22. Kenneth G. Starr, Liberty and EqualiEy Under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1; Stephen L. Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms
of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7 , 61 & 11.166.
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that is ultimately threatening to freedom.23 This danger,
however, does not stem from the substance of religious ideas.
Rather, the danger arises from how the individual utilizes
religion in structuring her existence-how in essence the
believer uses religion to define herself. The specific tenets of
belief (religious ideas) are in many cases wholly irrelevant to
the self-defining process. Indeed, religion, for some, is not a
method of developing or examining one's beliefs at all. Rather,
it is a method used to shield the believer from facing
uncertainties. Religion, in the words of one sociologist, becomes
a system of holding mechanisms that keep the believer from
facing the questions which must terrify humanity-What is
God? What is meaning? What is life?24
Because of this, some believers develop a passionate
adherence to their beliefs which leads to an us-versus-them
mentality with respect to those who do not share their belief
systems.25Competing belief systems are then seen as threats
to the individual's sense of self. For some, this means that the
competing belief systems must therefore be attacked. When
this happens the believer may seek to wholly eradicate the
opposing belief systems which she feels are so threatening. In
this way, religious persecution and intolerance are created not
by the ideas of religion, but by the psychology of adhesion to
religious beliefs-a psychology which seeks not to understand
or address religious issues but rather to avoid them,
paradoxically, by passionate and unquestioned devotion to
them. This is the type of religious belief and reaction we have
seen surface in India, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and
the Baltics. In this respect, it is worth noting that religious
wars are many things, but they are seldom a battle over ideas.
The dangers created by the nature of unquestioned
adherence to religious belief, moreover, are exacerbated
because the believer becomes particularly susceptible to
manipulation by government and political leaders. As I have
suggested else~here:~it is not the religious leaders who
advocate crhches a t city halls, it is the political leaders. The
23.
See William P . Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGSL.J.
(forthcoming 1993).
24.
JAMESBREECH,
THE SILENCE
OF JESUS46 (1983).
See generdly MIRCEA ELIADE,THE SACRED
AND THE PROFANE (Willard
25.
Trask trans., 1959).
26.
William P. Marshall, Is the Constitutional Concern with Religious
Involvement in the Public Square Hostility? 42 DEPAULL. REV.305, 308 (1992).
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lesson is clear: there is political hay to be made in appealing t o
the religious sentiments of the political majority.
It is because of this understanding of the dangers of
religion that Justice Kennedy is right in acknowledging that
there must be a special limitation which prevents religion from
"winning" government. When the state is used to advance
religion's self-reinforcement mechanisms, then the danger of
coercion and oppression of opposing groups becomes
paramount.
For this reason, I would suggest that my Smith
argument-that total equality among belief systems is required
by the First Amendment-is
not fully accurate. The
.Establishment Clause does provide an exception. But I would
not retreat from my position that there remains an overall
commitment to an equality among ideas. The establishment
prohibition is not based upon a concern with religious ideas but
with potential religious behavior.
In a sense this is good news. Once it is realized that it is
not the inclusion of religious ideas that triggers the
establishment prohibition, but rather the attempt by religion to
use government to reinforce its own "holding mechanisms" and
tools of self-identification, then it makes sense that the
establishment prohibition should not be applied to invalidate
state laws only because those laws have some religious
component. Thus, under this understanding, cases such as
Harris u. M C R U ~or
~ ' Bowers u. H a r d ~ i c k , ~which
'
suggest
that there is no Establishment Clause violation simply because
the prohibitions on abortion or homosexuality have some
religious basis, are correctly decided. Indeed, if religion's
attempts to use the political processes to reinforce its selfidentity are the crux of the establishment prohibition, then I
might agree with former Solicitor General Starr when he said
that Lee u. Weisman could come out differently if viewed as an
equality-of-expression case rather than an attempt to get the
government to promote religious practice. The key to the
establishment inquiry quite rightly becomes whether
government is being used t o endorse religion, not whether
there is any religious component to the challenged acti~ity.~'

27.
28.
29.

448 US. 297, 298 (1980).
478 U.S.186 (1986).
See Lynch v. Domelly, 465 U.S.668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring).

'
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In sum, the establishment prohibition does in some sense
transgress the equality-of-ideas principle. However, the
constitutionally imposed inequality is narrow and is not based
upon a negative inference as to the inherent value of religious
ideas or practices. It is based upon the danger of allowing
religion, not religious ideas, to prevail in the political process.

